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1  Introduction
A key concern of empirical research on democracy is to assess and compare 
different types of political regimes. Measuring democracy plays a prominent 
role. Its origins lie in the works of Lipset (1959) and Dahl (1956) and have been 
continued and developed in numerous other studies (for a summary see: Lauth 
2004; Pickel and Pickel 2006). The existing empirical works distinguish them-
selves noticeably in that they focus almost exclusively on the national level 
while the subnational level is practically ignored. This gap in the research 
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cannot be filled by simply transferring national democracy measurements onto 
subnational entities for at least two reasons. Firstly, the existing measurements 
cannot explain the variation in the quality of democracy across subnational 
entities, particularly in federal systems (Kropp et al. 2008). Secondly, existing 
measurements almost entirely disregard direct-democratic settings which are 
more widely used at the subnational than the national level. In order to under-
stand the Swiss political system, which will be more closely analysed below, an 
analysis of the cantons is important given that this was where modern Swiss 
democracy developed (Kölz 2004: p. 41). We argue that an examination of the 
varying quality of complex democratic decision-making structures in Swit-
zerland is only possible through comparatively applied analyses of cantonal 
systems. These, in turn, have to be based on suitable and newly developed 
measurements of democracy.
The Swiss cantons like to be considered ideal “research laboratories” (Vatter 
2002, 2006; Freitag 2005; Selb 2006; Bühlmann et  al. 2009a) where different 
political institutions, with varying impacts on political conduct and public 
policy, can be reviewed. There are a number of projects concentrating on can-
tonal patterns of democracy as defined by Lijphart’s dimensions of power 
sharing and their effects (Vatter 2002, 2007; Vatter and Freitag 2006, 2007). 
However, there is no literature that deals with the many facets of the quality of 
Swiss cantonal democracy, as is generally the case in international comparative 
research. Furthermore, there is currently no comparative longitudinal analysis 
of cantonal democratic systems that covers a greater period. Existing studies on 
patterns of cantonal democracy have, as a rule, not considered all 26 cantons, 
often excluding the smaller and/or Landsgemeinde cantons on the basis of their 
special characteristics. The goal of this article is to fill these gaps and present 
a theoretical and empirically-founded analysis of the democratic patterns and 
dimensions in all Swiss cantons. The multi-dimensional qualities of democ-
racy in the cantons will be measured and analysed through a newly developed 
measuring instrument using expansive data. Our dual instrument is based on 
a democracy concept that simultaneously arranges liberal-representative and 
radical-participatory models of democracy into ideal types. Whereas the radical-
participatory type comprises well-developed participatory options including 
radical participation, public accountability and the widest possible inclusion, 
the liberal type distinguishes itself through the emphasis on constitutional-legal 
guarantees and strong horizontal-institutional as well as predominantly verti-
cal-electoral controls. Both ideal types are distinguished by several dimensions, 
the characteristics of which were measured in the cantons at different points in 
time.
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Building on this new measuring instrument, the focus of this article is 
the empirical examination of the widespread language-cultural hypothesis of 
democracy-typical differences between the Latin and German-speaking cantons 
(Kriesi and Wisler 1996; Vatter 2002; Linder 2005, 2010; Freitag 2006; Ladner 
and Bühlmann 2007; Stadelmann-Steffen and Freitag 2011). Existing research 
assumes that the German-speaking cantons are characterized primarily by direct-
democratic and participatory elements, while the Latin cantons are more liberal-
representative oriented. In our article we present an alternative explanation for 
this hypothesis and test – based on the political Erblast hypothesis (Rose and 
Davies 1994) – whether the particular constitutional movements during the emer-
gence of cantonal democratic regimes in the mid-19th century have left traces in 
the cantons today and whether they are the cause for the different cantonal pat-
terns of democracy.
In the next section, we explain the measuring concept used to test the two 
concurrent hypotheses. The theoretical derivation and empirical examination of 
the two alternative explanations for the different implementations of democracy 
will be dealt with in Sections 3 and 4, with conclusions presented in Section 5.
2   Liberal and Radical Democracies – A Dual 
Concept of Measurement
Research in the field of the empirical investigation of democracy has recently 
expanded: measuring democracy no longer focuses solely on measuring the 
differences between democracies and autocracies, but increasingly also on the 
evaluation of the quality of established democratic systems (Bühlmann et  al. 
2012a,b). To this end one of the central requirements is the provision of a coher-
ent concept of democracy as a basis for measuring democracy. There are already 
several proposals for the measurement of the quality of democracy (Bühlmann 
et al. 2009b); however these lack the inclusion of instruments of direct democ-
racy (Altman 2013), and also fail to analyse subnational entities.
Swiss cantons are distinguished in international comparison in that they 
provide citizens with highly developed means for direct participation (Vatter 
2002, 2006). An instrument that is able to adequately measure the subnational 
quality of democracy in the cantons must incorporate this participatory element 
and be based on a sufficiently broad concept of democracy (Bühlmann et  al. 
2009b). Such a concept is developed through two basic channels of democratic 
thought which have particularly shaped the Swiss cantons: the liberal and the 
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radical models of democracy.1 While the liberal model is based on constitutionally 
guaranteed freedom rights, separation of powers and representation, the radical 
model of democracy strives for the maximum direct participation of all citizens in 
public consensus-building proceedings and direct-democratic decision-making 
(Held 2006). The dual measuring instrument presented in this article combines 
the central aspects of both democratic models, important both in theory and in 
the Swiss environment, and thereby allows their simultaneous measurement. 
The relevant criteria for measuring the quality of democracy are determined by 
the requirements of particular democratic concepts. Three central dimensions of 
democratic quality each derive from the liberal and radical theoretical traditions. 
This deduction represents the first step in conceptualising the measuring instru-
ment. The six dimensions are more precisely defined by various components in 
further deductive steps, and these components are then measured using subcom-
ponents and indicators. We next examine the theoretical foundation of the six 
dimensions and their components (cf. also Table 1).
2.1  Liberal Dimensions of Democracy
The underlying liberal-democratic model is based on Locke’s liberal consti-
tutionalism, Montesquieu’s separation of powers, and the idea of direct gov-
ernment responsibility vis-à-vis the electorate pursuant to Bentham, James 
Mill, and John Stuart Mill. Variations of these three dimensions run through-
out liberal-democratic theory and have become key factors in theoretical and 
empirical research on democracy. In connection with liberal constitutionalism, 
freedom rights as well as aspects of the rule of law are discussed and measured. 
With regard to the separation of powers, the focus is on the concept of hori-
zontal accountability, while governmental responsibility vis-à-vis the electorate 
is discussed in terms of electoral accountability. An explanation of these three 
dimensions follows.
1 The terms “radical” and “liberal” simultaneously refer to debates on the development of fed-
eral and cantonal citizens’ rights which, in 19th century Switzerland, were predominantly under 
the control of the liberal and radical (and later on the democrat) wings of the liberal party (cf. 
Kölz 1992; Vatter 2002). Gruner (1977: 75f) positions the liberal wing’s ideological roots alongside 
the ideas of Benjamin Constant in that what is required is a strong representative democracy and 
heavy restrictions on the state in favour of the, above all, economically independent individual. 
By contrast, radicalism, heavily influenced by Ignaz Paul Troxler, holds citizens above every 
constitutional legislative authority. Radicals called for universal suffrage and the citizens’ right 
to demand a review of the constitution at an early stage.
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2.1.1  Liberal Constitutionalism
As the first dimension of the liberal-democratic model, liberal constitutional-
ism consists of two components. These were cemented in Locke’s (1963 [1689]) 
concept of constitutionalism whereby government authorities must be imper-
sonal and constitutionally restricted to protect individual freedom:
1. Individual freedom. Over time, liberal traditional thought has extended 
the catalogue of demands for individual freedom rights. While Locke (1963 
[1689]), in his theory of a social contract, acts on the assumption of a pre-
state right to life, freedom, and property, Bentham (1960 [1776], 1843 [1831]) 
and James Mill (1937 [1820]) maintain that the freedoms of press, speech 
and association are instruments against corruption. Finally, John Stuart Mill 
(1859) highlights the right to one’s own personal life. These freedoms pre-
suppose, from a liberal perspective, a limit to the influence of the state. It is 
this limitation that ensures the utilitarian idea of free transactions between 
individuals (Mill 1937 [1820]; Bentham 1960 [1776]). The effective protection 
of these freedoms depends on the extent to which democratically applied 
laws and regulations are accepted and complied with by individual citizens 
(Beetham 2004).
2. Rule of law. Locke insists that without restrictions on authority, tyranny will 
ensue (1963 [1689], ch. 18). Montesquieu (1994 [1748]) supports a system of 
positive legislation that sets inviolable boundaries for actions of the state 
to limit despotism and corruption. So that democracy does not revert to 
the “tyranny of the majority” (Tocqueville 2006 [1835]), basic human and 
minority rights must be placed out of reach of majority decision-making 
(Diamond and Morlino 2004; O’Donnell 2004). The basis of inviolable 
national justice implies formal as well as material legal obligations of the 
state. With the principle of legal equality (Montesquieu 1994 [1748]), equal 
access to the courts and equal treatment in the eyes of the law is required 
(Beetham 2004).
2.1.2  Horizontal Accountability
The idea of the separation of powers is an early and fundamental component of 
liberal-democratic theory. The control of government and adherence to constitu-
tional principles must be secured through a mutual balance of power. In modern 
research on democracy, separation of powers is studied through the concept of 
horizontal accountability – the second dimension of the liberal-democratic type 
used here. Through a network of relatively autonomous institutions, authorities 
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mutually control each other and make a commitment to act both lawfully and 
constitutionally (O’Donnell 1994: p. 61; Schedler 1999: pp. 14–18). Horizontal 
accountability is measured using the following four components:
1. Strength of parliament versus government. Locke (1963) [1689]) emphasizes 
that only the separation of power between the executive and the legislative 
branches guarantees that both are subordinate to the law, rather than being 
allowed to pursue private interests. The idea of checks and balances later 
became the core of the Federalist Papers (Hamilton et  al. 1788: Art 47–51). 
Current research on democracy also emphasizes the need for a strong parlia-
ment capable of keeping the reins on government (Beetham and Boyle 1995: 
pp. 66–74).
2. Power-sharing within parliament. In modern representative democracies, the 
relationship between the executive and the legislative is co-determined in 
a decisive way by power-sharing arrangements within parliament and the 
strength of the opposition (Altman and Pérez-Liñan 2002).
3. Judicial independence. An independent judiciary is essential for the security 
of individual rights and prevention against oppression (Montesquieu 1994 
[1748]: Book XI, Ch. 6). Madison (Hamilton et al. 1788: Art 51) also demands 
professional, politically independent courts; a concept incompatible with the 
election of judges and term-of-office restrictions.
4. Independent controlling instances. Abuse of government power is ultimately 
restricted in that political decisions are subject to judicial and constitutional 
review (Hayek 1960). To prevent corruption and despotism, it is further nec-
essary that the state apparatus is controlled by an independent administra-
tive court. Additional “agencies of protection” like auditing commissions, 
anti-corruption authorities or Ombudsmen can further protect the rights of 
citizens against abuses of power (Beetham 2004: pp. 68, 71; Diamond and 
Morlino 2005: p. xxi).
2.1.3  Electoral Accountability
In the liberal tradition of political thought, the state is the creator of laws for 
individuals who entrust themselves to the power of government in order to 
implement citizens’ objectives (Locke 1963 [1689]: pp. 308, 395). At the same 
time, a liberal-democratic model relies on the delegation of power to repre-
sentatives as a proven tool against the danger of a tyranny of the majority 
(Hamilton et al. 1788: Art. 10): whereas citizens allow themselves to be guided 
by their own interests, representative institutions offer a place for profes-
sional deliberation. In this way, democracies confront the question of how 
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citizens’ representatives can be held accountable. The solution is provided 
by secret and competitive elections that guarantee a responsive legislature 
(Bentham 1843 [1831]: p. 47). Contemporary research on democracy examines 
this problem under the heading of “electoral accountability,” understood as 
the relationship of accountability between rulers and voters (O’Donnell 2004). 
This third dimension of liberal democracy is conceptualized by five different 
components:
1. Free, secret and regular elections. Regularly held elections are equal to a sanc-
tioning mechanism, forcing representatives to consider the will of voters in 
order to be re-elected. In this way, ballot secrecy should guarantee that citi-
zens can express their preferences free from undue influence.
2. Competition. Supported by Bartolini (1999, 2000), different facets of electoral 
competitions can be differentiated from one another. The electoral race in 
democratic elections requires a system as open as possible to new competi-
tors (“contestability”), while the elections themselves should be as competi-
tive as possible (“electoral vulnerability”).
3. Electoral availability. Bartolini (1999, 2000) further suggests that an impor-
tant factor of competition, and a condition for electoral accountability, is 
“electoral availability,” meaning the fundamental willingness of voters to 
change their party preference.
4. Clarity of responsibility. So that the electorate can consider sanctioning 
current public officials, a clear assignment of responsibilities is needed. 
However, where there is a large number of coalition partners, that is no 
longer the case (Powell and Whitten 1993: pp. 399–400).
5. Governmental autonomy. A functioning relationship of accountability 
between government and voters assumes not only that regular elections act 
as (potential) sanctions, but also that governments possess a certain action 
autonomy. So that the chain of responsibility comes full circle, governments 
must be able to implement democratically made decisions. To do this, govern-
ments require not only protection against attempts by illegitimate interests to 
exert influence (cf. Merkel 2004), but also a certain degree of sovereignty over 
other levels of the state as well as over protests and blocking attempts by citi-
zens themselves (Pitkin 1967).
2.2  Radical Dimensions of Democracy
The radical-democratic model, the second pillar of our dual measuring strat-
egy, is based on participatory and at times deliberative theories of democ-
racy as summarized by Cohen and Fung (2004) under the heading of “radical 
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democracy.”2 The origins of radical theories of democracy stem from ancient 
Athenian’s public voting by show of hands, Rousseau’s republicanism, and 
Marxist democratic theory (cf. Held 2006: pp. 5, 187). Like the liberal tradi-
tion above, the radical tradition of thought can equally be understood as 
having three key dimensions: radical participation, public accountability, 
and inclusion.
2.2.1  Radical Participation
According to radical-democratic theory, active participation in public life pro-
motes self-fulfilment and the development of civic virtues. Significant value is 
placed on the political participation of individuals (Pateman 1970: pp. 25, 43; 
Macpherson 1977: pp. 114–115; Barber 1984: pp. 117–162, 232). Diverse and compre-
hensive participatory mechanisms are therefore required (Pateman 1970; Barber 
1984: p. 272), described in turn by the following four components:
1. Extended electoral rights. Although radical democrats are sceptical of the 
delegation of competencies from citizens to representative organs (Rous-
seau 1762: pp. 235–239; Barber 1984: pp. 145–147), they generally accept that 
a pure system of direct-democratic self-government would exceed citizens’ 
resources (e.g. Barber 1984: p. 267). Insofar as delegation is inevitable, citi-
zens must entrust powers of control and, if need be, of sanction to their repre-
sentatives. Not only members of the legislative but also those of the executive 
and judicative should be chosen through direct popular vote. Moreover, a 
recall of representatives should also be possible.
2. Direct democracy. The enabling of more refined forms of direct-democratic 
participation and the power of citizens even in-between elections is regarded 
as very important in the radical model. Citizens must have the power to both 
correct the decisions of their representatives and place new concerns onto 
the agenda (Macpherson 1983: p. 132; Barber 1984: pp. 281–289; cf. also Rous-
seau 1762).
3. Use of direct democracy. The effective and regular use of formal participatory 
rights is necessary to achieve the goals of individual self-realization and col-
lective self-government.
4. Local self-government. According to radical thought, self-government is best 
achieved where citizens are most directly affected and where they can have 
2 Participatory and deliberative theories of democracy are also presented by Schmidt (2010: pp. 
236–253), for example, as characteristics of a collective stream (cf. also Saward 2001 and Fung 
2006).
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the most direct influence. That is why strong local autonomy is a central 
requirement of participatory democratic theory (Macpherson 1977: p. 108; 
Barber 1984: pp. 267–273).
2.2.2  Public Accountability
From a radical-democractic perspective, elections and the separation of 
powers alone are not enough for citizens to effectively hold their representa-
tives to account; additional mechanisms of public discourse as well as infor-
mal means of participation are required (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000: pp. 
149, 151; Young 2000: pp. 153, 173–177; Lauth 2004). Public accountability, 
the second dimension of radical democracy, is summarized by way of three 
components:
1. Transparency. Information about political processes is a central requirement 
for accountability. The easier it is to obtain such information, the more trans-
parently the political process is implemented and presented and the more 
likely it is that the public can enter into a meaningful debate with the politi-
cal elite and hold them to account (cf. Beetham 1994: p. 37; Diamond and 
Morlino 2004; Schmitter 2005).
2. Media. Public debate as a central component of functioning public account-
ability should not only be conducted between authorities and citizens but 
should also take place within an active public environment. Independent and 
varied media create a platform for different views so that no one is excluded 
(cf. Cohen 1989: pp. 22–23; Voltmer 2000). Furthermore, as “watchdogs” or 
a “fourth estate,” the media can take on an autonomous control function 
(Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). How much citizens benefit from varied and 
critical media ultimately depends on the extent to which they are actually 
utilized.
3. Extra-institutional participation. Even extra-institutional forms of partic-
ipation can be channels for the registration of preferences and can put 
decision-makers who behave unresponsively under pressure (Smulovitz 
and Peruzzotti 2000: pp. 151–152; Young 2001). A broad and constitution-
ally secure participatory culture with politically active citizens and strong 
civil society organizations not only enriches public debate, but also allows 
for additional control over public officials (cf. Pateman 1970; Macpher-
son 1977: pp. 98–114; Barber 1984: pp. 264–266; Beetham 1994: pp. 29–30; 
Young 2000: p. 153; Merkel 2004: pp. 46–47; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 
2006: pp. 10–12).
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2.2.3  Inclusion
The third and final dimension of the radical model of democracy focusses on the 
equality of all individuals. All those affected by decisions are regarded as equally 
legitimated and able to take part in the decision-making process (cf. Rousseau 
1762; Barber 1984: pp. 225–229; Dahl 1998: pp. 62–78; Schmidt 2010: pp. 236–241). 
Differences between individuals and social groups are expressly not seen as argu-
ments against equal inclusion, but rather as enriching diversity to benefit rational 
decision-making (Dryzek 1990: pp. 41–42; Young 2000: pp. 81–120). Inclusion 
thus enhances both the quality as well as the legitimacy of political decisions. 
The concept of inclusion is based on two components:
1. Equal political involvement. Inclusion not only means the involvement of all 
affected citizens (cf. Goodin 2007), but more particularly equal involvement 
(cf. Cohen 1989: pp. 22–23; Young 2000: p. 11). In this regard, equal involve-
ment anticipates the possession of political rights, especially in the form 
of universal voting rights (Paxton et  al. 2003). In addition to formal equal 
rights, radical-democratic theory places value on an unbiased use of partici-
patory rights independent of status or gender (cf. Smith 2009: pp. 20–22). 
Equal involvement is facilitated when the state provides minimal resources, 
allowing for the independent political activity of all individuals (Rousseau 
1762: pp. 124–125; Pateman 1970: p. 22; cf. also Merkel 2004: pp. 44–45). This 
includes political education alongside material resources (Barber 1984; Dahl 
1998: pp. 79–80).
2. Inclusive representation. As much as possible, the collective political and 
social diversity of society should be mirrored inside the representative organs. 
On the one hand, this means substantive representation, in other words 
adequate representation of the political views of citizens. On the other hand, 
what is required is also a descriptive representation of the socio-structural 
distribution inside these representative organs (Young 2000; Arato 2006). An 
institutional condition for inclusive representation is an electoral system that 
has the lowest possible electoral threshold (cf. Lijphart 2004; Arato 2006).
2.3  The Multi-Dimensional Measuring Instrument
The six democratic dimensions derived from both the liberal and the radical 
democracy models and their respective components and subcomponents (cf. 
Table 1) are the basis of the instrument that measures the quality of democracy. 
Following Munck and Verkuilen (2002), during the development of this instru-
ment particular attention is paid to the three main challenges of operationali-
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zation: conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation (cf. Müller and Pickel 
2007).
2.3.1  Conceptualization
The conceptualization of democratic quality proposed here is new in that it incor-
porates both established liberal-democratic as well as radical-democratic dimen-
sions. The approach adopted allows for the qualities of distinctive liberal and 
radical democracies to be differentiated; the characteristics of the Swiss cantons 
can thus adequately be measured. The multi-dimensional conceptualization of 
the measuring instrument follows the methodological approach of Pickel and 
Pickel (2006): p. 269; cf. also Bühlmann et al. 2008, 2012a,b). The six dimensions 
examined are understood as abstract democratic functions. They can be realized 
with the help of the formal and informal institutional arrangements that appear 
at the component and subcomponent levels of the hierarchically-structured 
measuring instrument.3 This measuring concept also allows for a methodologi-
cal critique of existing democracy measurement (Munck and Verkuilen 2002: pp. 
12–14) in that the subordinate levels can be systematically and gradually derived 
from, and selectively defined by, the respective superior levels.
2.3.2  Measurement
Even though the subcomponents are more concrete than their dimensions 
(Table 1), they are still regarded as latent variables (cf. Bollen 1989: Ch. 6; Treier 
and Jackman 2008) which can only be measured in approximate terms, using 
a series of indicators. For the actual measurement, every subcomponent must 
therefore be operationalized using multiple quantifiable indicators. At the same 
time, our goal to reveal differences in quality between established and cultur-
ally similar subnational democracies requires a delicate and complex measuring 
instrument capable of capturing to which degree and in which way formal demo-
cratic institutions actually function in a given context (Bühlmann et  al. 2008: 
p.  117; 2009: p. 459). That is why less formalized structural features (“rules in 
use”) of cantonal democracy are factored in alongside formal institutions (“rules 
in form”). In other words, below the subcomponents are indicators obtained by 
3 We have followed the functional research strategy as suggested by Lauth (2004) for the inter-
cultural comparison of democracy: universal democratic functions can be realised using con-
text-specific “functional equivalents.”
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way of an analysis of legal texts (rules in form) as well as variables that measure 
the constitutional reality (rules in use) (e.g. survey data).
This approach can be illustrated using the operationalization of the “media” 
component in the context of the Swiss cantons. The contribution of the media 
to a high quality of public accountability is assessed, firstly, on the basis of sta-
tistics on the number and distribution of independent newspapers in a canton. 
Secondly, the degree of actual media use by citizens per canton is determined 
through survey data. Finally, on the basis of an analysis of legislative texts, the 
formal provisions for the promotion of information diversity and public access to 
the media are evaluated.
Through the application of such different data sources, the danger of system-
atic mistakes in measurement is reduced and the validity of our results thereby 
increased (Munck and Verkuilen 2002: pp. 15–16; Lauth 2004: pp. 306–307). 
The same also applies to the relatively high number of indicators: 371 indica-
tors were originally allocated to the theoretically-derived subcomponents and 
tested accordingly by way of a factor analysis to detect their dimensionalities. 
As expected, not all indicators within the same subcomponents loaded onto the 
same factor. In such cases we also took into account qualitative considerations 
for the validity and reliability of the different indicators. This approach ultimately 
led to the operationalization of the 48 subcomponents by evaluating particular 
factors from the associated indicators (178 in total), whereby every subcompo-
nent was determined on the basis of at least two indicators (for a list of all the 
indicators applied, see the Appendix).
During the collection of annual data for the 26 cantons from 1979 to 2009 we 
were able to rely on secondary sources to some extent, but primary data had to be 
collected for many indicators. However, it was impossible to find adequate data 
for all the years within the research period, so gaps were filled using constant 
time periods or through linear inter- or extrapolation. The method used for each 
indicator was carefully considered.4
2.3.3  Aggregation
The incremental aggregation from indicator- to dimension-level is based on the 
hierarchical, theoretical conceptualization of democracy’s six dimensions. In the 
first step, and as already mentioned above, the selected theory-driven and empir-
ically suitable indicators were condensed into 48 subcomponents through factor 
4 Due to limited space, the exact coding details for each indicator cannot be shown here. The 
detailed codebook and raw data are available from the authors upon request.
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analyses. This factor-analytical approach to the determination of the subcompo-
nents’ values based on indicators reflects our understanding of the subcompo-
nents as latent variables. In the first step of aggregation, none of the theoretical 
constructs were aggregated, although relatively meaningful theoretical conclu-
sions would be available.5
In the second step, the factors of the subcomponents were standardized and 
condensed into the corresponding components. The averages of the standard-
ized component values then ultimately represent the six dimensions. In this way, 
every element of the corresponding normative criteria matrix is incorporated with 
the same weight.6 The averaging explicitly derives from ancillary connections 
between the (sub)components, meaning that a low value in one (sub)component 
can be compensated by a higher value in another.
3  Two Concurrent Hypotheses
The new measuring instrument can be used not only to analyse and describe 
forms and qualities of cantonal democracies, but the values of the dimensions 
and ensuing democracy types can also be used as either dependent or explana-
tory variables. In reality, there are different approaches to explain institutional 
varieties of democracies in empirical democracy research. Based on Freitag and 
Vatter (2009), Lijphart (1999: 250ff.), Kaiser (1997: p. 422), or Vatter (2002: 414ff.) 
and taking into account the particular characteristics of the Swiss cantons, we 
examine two competing hypotheses (as well as a variation of one of these two) on 
what explains variation across Swiss cantonal democracies.
The first relies on the cultural commonality of political systems to explain 
the development of political institutional settings. Pursuant to this hypothesis, 
common cultural regions shape the understanding of democracy and are forma-
tive for the evaluation of different forms of democracy in the cantons. More 
5 The factors were calculated in SPSS using the regression method on the basis of principal 
component analysis. Six of the 48 subcomponents were each further subdivided into two sub-
subcomponents which were then treated as latent variables.
6 A factorised aggregation strategy was considered as an alternative approach to estimate the 
subcomponents. From a democracy theory point of view the unequal loading of the conceptu-
ally equal components appears problematic especially when individual components (such as an 
analysed canton year) are completely excluded because they do not load onto the same factor. If 
those components were subsequently but nevertheless proportionately calculated, very similar 
results ultimately are produced, for example in the case of transparent and clearly interpretable 
averaging.
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specifically, subnational comparative democracy research commonly assumes 
that German-speaking cantons are characterized by radical and inclusive forms 
of citizen participation, while the Latin cantons7 more strongly follow the liberal, 
power-separating and representative democracy model of France. Stadelmann-
Steffen and Freitag (2011: pp. 533–534) summarize this widespread position as 
follows: “The Swiss cantons offer an excellent opportunity to assess the relevance 
of the participatory-inclusive and representative-delegative logic of democracy” 
whereby the German-speaking cantons match the former democracy type and the 
French-speaking cantons the latter. According to Stadelmann-Steffen and Freitag 
(2011), one can expect that the regional language differences of the two ideal 
types of democracy theory correspond to our dual measurement model. Thus the 
first hypothesis posits that the Swiss-German cantons follow the radical democ-
racy model while Latin cantons match the liberal one.
With regard to current research debate, at least one variation of the first 
hypothesis should equally be analysed: a regional language difference is also 
posited between specific dimensions of the two democracy models, and not only 
in relation to their entirety. Linder (2005: p. 272) for example observes that the 
culture of direct democracy is more strongly pronounced in German-speaking 
Switzerland while the French-speaking cantons and Ticino conform more to the 
basic model of “representative” democracy with little influence of direct democ-
racy. Ladner (2007) likewise concludes that in the Latin regions of Switzerland, 
the idea of representative, electoral democracy with a comparatively high value 
placed on parliament is more developed than in German-speaking Switzerland, 
which is distinguished by highly developed instruments of direct democracy 
(cf. also Ladner 1991; Vatter 2002; Linder 2010). In our measuring concept, the 
following observations of specific dimensions can be made: The “participation” 
dimension of the radical model of democracy stands primarily for participative, 
direct-democratic structures while the “electoral accountability” dimension of 
the liberal model of democracy combines representative-democratic institu-
tions in which both formal rules and constitutional reality are considered. On 
the basis of the posited regional language differences concerning the forms of 
direct and representative democracy, we thus also analyse whether the cantons 
in the individual language regions adopt specific characteristics in the “partici-
pation” and “electoral accountability” dimensions. According to Linder (2005), 
hypothesis 1B is then defined as follows: Cantons in Latin Switzerland have 
higher values in the “electoral accountability” dimension and lower values in 
7 Latin Switzerland comprises the seven cantons where the German-speaking population is a 
minority (Ticino, Fribourg, Vaud, Valais, Neuchâtel, Geneva, and Jura).
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the “participation” dimension, while German-speaking cantons display the 
opposite pattern.
The second approach to explaining democracy (types) presents an alter-
native to the prevailing “cultural-linguistic hypothesis.” It relies on a central 
assumption of historical institutionalism that values institutional arrange-
ments primarily as a legacy of earlier social debate but influential until this 
very day. The political “Erblast” hypothesis (Rose and Davis 1994) highlights the 
common historical background of state entities and the great inertia of regu-
lations adopted much earlier. According to this approach, specific models of 
democratic techniques for conflict resolution are the result of common historical 
legacies and preceding constitutional traditions that possess great inertia. The 
historical continuity of political institutions is primarily traced back to formative 
historical periods that preclude alternative developments (Collier and Collier 
1991). To analyse the political Erblast hypothesis we examine the influence of 
democratic constitutional movements between 1830 and 1870 on the models of 
cantonal democracy between 1979 and 2009. According to Kölz (2004: p. 42), 
the cantons can be divided into four groups on the basis of their historical con-
stitutional movements in the course of the democratization process of the 19th 
century. The first group is composed of cantons with a liberal-regenerative but 
no democratic movement.8 It includes the francophone and liberal-individualist 
thinking cantons Vaud, Geneva, and Neuchâtel,9 but also Lucerne and St. Gall. 
According to Kölz (2004: 43ff.), the second group is composed of the regenera-
tive cantons with democratic movement, namely the Swiss-German cantons of 
Zurich, Berne, Solothurn, Basel-Country, Schaffhausen, Aargau, and Thurgau. 
The third group consists of the German-speaking Landsgemeinde cantons. With 
their longstanding direct-democratic, collective and pre-modern traditions, a 
liberal-regenerative movement was out of the question (Kölz 2004: 231ff.). The 
group includes Uri, Schwyz, Obwalden, Nidwalden, Glarus, Zug, Appenzell 
Inner- and Outer-Rhodes as well as Grisons. Finally, a fourth group consists of 
cantons with a special kind of constitutional development (Kölz 2004: 325ff.). 
Common characteristics of this last group are the strong position of conserva-
tives, a late (if at all) and mostly weak liberal-regenerative movement, and the 
8 While the liberal-regenerative movement fought primarily for individual freedoms, legal 
equality, separation of powers, and strong parliamentary government, democratic movements 
advocated the implementation of socio-political and egalitarian goals through the adoption and 
expansion of direct-democratic citizen rights (Kölz 2004).
9 Neuchâtel constitutes a special case within this group on the basis of its monarchical back-
ground. However, its first constitution of 1848 was a particularly pronounced example of a clas-
sic power-separating liberal-representative constitution (Kölz 2004).
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absence of a democratic movement. A prime example is Basel-City which had 
become a city-state due to a cantonal division. It was governed during the regen-
erative period by the so-called “Ratsherrenregiment” (Alderman regime) and 
had, until 1875, a restorative constitution with moderate conservative and indi-
vidual liberal elements (Kölz 2004: p. 337).10 The conservative-catholic French-
speaking cantons of Fribourg and Valais also belong to this group. Of all the 
cantons, they most strongly resisted democratization and constitutional reform. 
Though Kölz (2004: 325ff.) describes Fribourg as a canton with a liberal constitu-
tion lacking in direct-democratic elements, he includes it in the fourth group due 
to the strong position of conservatives.11 Similarly, the liberal-conservative 1852 
and 1875 constitutions of Valais are characterized by strong conservative-restor-
ative elements and the absence of direct democracy. The only Italian-speaking 
canton is an exceptional case and likewise assigned to the fourth group. Ticino, 
shaped by much unrest, has a representative constitution in line with the French-
Helvetian model (Kölz 2004: p. 330). A final exception is Jura, founded only in 
1979. According to Kölz (2004: p. 467), the first constitution of Jura was unusual 
in that it directly referred to the 1789 French Declaration of Human Rights that 
explicitly guarantees classic-liberal freedoms, while at the same time meeting 
only the minimum of citizens’ rights. If one summarizes Kölz’s (2004) typol-
ogy of cantonal constitutional movements with reference to both democracy 
models that are the main focus here, those cantons with liberal-regenerative but 
no democratic movement (group 1) as well as those with conservative-liberal 
constitutions and no democratic movement (group 4) more closely correspond 
to the liberal-democratic model. Meanwhile, the regenerative cantons with a 
democratic movement (group 2) as well as the Landsgemeinde cantons with 
longstanding direct-democratic traditions (group 3) would be assigned to the 
radical-democratic model. On a continuum of democracy forms from liberal to 
radical, the liberal-regenerative cantons without democracy movement and the 
Landsgemeinde cantons are positioned at either end, while the other two groups 
are closer to the middle.
A variation of the theory of path dependency just presented emphasizes 
the role of contemporary historical and political events (so-called “critical junc-
tures;” see Pierson 2000) to explain the characteristic forms of democratic insti-
tutions. Specific decisions, encountered at particular critical turning points, can 
10 In contrast to all other cantonal constitutions, the constitution of Basel-City does not contain 
any commitment to popular sovereignty.
11 Fribourg was the last Swiss canton to abandon representative democracy (Kölz 2004: p. 336). 
The popular election of the cantonal government, the legislative initiative and the optional leg-
islative referendum were only introduced in 1921.
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thus lead to path changes and institutional reform that, although limited by 
context, redefine the logic of institutional regimes (Kaiser 2002). The hypothesis 
of critical junctures is best illustrated by the canton of Berne: the deep-seated 
crisis in the relationship with the canton’s Jura region, the long-lasting and some-
times violent conflicts between separatist movements and those loyal to Berne, 
and the secession of the northern part of the Jura region that led to the crea-
tion of Jura canton in 1979, were, without a doubt, politically influential events 
for Berne. The financial scandal uncovered in the mid-1980s, in which the gov-
ernment of Berne had misused lottery money to financially support the “Force 
démocratique,” a militant organization in Berne’s Jura region, likewise received 
a lot of attention. These extraordinary events subsequently led to a total revi-
sion of Berne’s constitution, adopted in 1993.12 Even where no such momentous 
events occurred, total revisions of cantonal constitutions constitute important 
stages in the democratic development which combine the collective experiences 
of social and political change of the past decades and mould them into insti-
tutional reform. Therefore, in light of progressive phases of democracy in the 
past 100 years, one can assume that more recent reforms allow for larger-scale 
emancipatory participation demands of society. Accordingly, better democracy 
values can be anticipated the more recent a total revision of a cantonal constitu-
tion has taken place.
Ultimately, in the sense of a control hypothesis, additional socio-structural 
and socio-economic characteristics should be included for the explanation of 
political-institutional differences. On the basis of the obvious socio-economic 
and socio-structural heterogeneity between the cantons, this approach has 
been used for some time to explain political-administrative differences between 
the Swiss cantons (Geser and Höpflinger 1977: p. 132; Horber and Joye 1979). A 
common indicator is the percentage of workers employed in each of the three 
economic sectors.13
12 It was the first constitution to introduce the principle of public access within the cantonal ad-
ministration, place particularly strong emphasis on government accountability, and give citizens 
the power of appointment and dismissal of government (Kölz 2004: p. 103).
13 We thank a reviewer of this article for suggestions of further possible control variables that we 
analysed in several regression models not presented here. Actually, neither the fact whether or 
not a canton had belonged to the “Sonderbund” (as an alternative variable for path dependen-
cy), additional variables to measure socio-structural heterogeneity (population density, percent-
age of Catholics), nor different geographical measurements (distance, proximity to France/Italy/
Germany) have any explanatory power. Moreover, these variables do not change the substantive 
results with respect to the variables that we have used. Because our analysis was constrained 
by a limited number of data, we have only used control variables with explanatory power in the 
following models.
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4   Liberal and Radical Cantonal Democracies 
Compared
A two-stage approach was chosen for the empirical analysis. In the first stage, the 
values of each individual canton are displayed on a democracy map. In doing so 
we used the mean z-transformed values for both the radical and liberal democ-
racy forms and both dimensions (radical participation and electoral account-
ability) over the whole time period (1979–2009). The horizontal axis represents 
the form of radical democracy (Figure 1) and the “radical participation” dimen-
sion (Figure 2), while the values for liberal democracy (Figure 1) and “electoral 
accountability” (Figure 2) are shown on the vertical axis. In the second stage, the 
hypotheses were tested using multivariate regression analyses.
Figure 1 positions the cantons within a two-dimensional field of liberal and 
radical democracies. It shows clusters of cantons that have both linguistic-cultural 
and constitutional-historical similarities. Thus the French-speaking cantons (VD, 
2.0
1.5
1.0
-1.0
0.5
-0.5
-2.0
-2.0
-1.5
-1.5 -1.0 1.00
Radical
-0.5 0.5 2.01.5
0
Li
be
ra
l
Figure 1: Conceptual Map of Cantonal Democracies along the Liberal and Radical Democracy 
Axes.
Explanation: Light grey: predominantly French-speaking cantons; grey: Ticino (TI); black: pre-
dominantly German-speaking cantons; the groups according to Kölz (2004): square: cantons 
with liberal regenerative movement but no democratic movement (VD, GE,NE, LU, SG); triangle: 
regenerative cantons with democratic movement (ZH, BE, SO, BL, SH, AG, TG); circle: Landsge-
meinde cantons (UR, SZ, AI, AR, OW, NW, GL, ZG, GR); diamond: cantons with special constitu-
tional development (BS, FR, VS, TI, JU).
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GE, and NE), characterized by a strong liberal-regenerative movement in the mid-
19th century and the absence of a democratic movement, are located as expected 
in the first quadrant of above-average liberal-representative but rather weak rad-
ical-democratic democracies. The two Swiss-German cantons that belong to this 
constitutional-historical group (LU and SG) stand out due to their comparably 
stronger radical-democratic but weaker liberal components.
The cantons with a liberal and a democratic constitutional movement – all 
of them Swiss-German cantons (ZH, BE, SO, BL, SH, AG and TG) – are located in 
the second quadrant of above-average liberal and radical democracies, with the 
exception of Thurgau, which lies just under the liberal mean. The third group 
of (former) Landsgemeinde cantons from German-speaking Switzerland (UR, SZ, 
OW, NW, GL, ZG, AR, AI and GR) are distributed over the third and fourth quad-
rants. These cantons all have below-average liberal democracy values. The fourth 
group of former catholic-conservative cantons with no liberal and democratic 
regenerative movement (BS, FR, VS, TI and JU) is characterized by heterogene-
ity. On the one hand, there are cantons with low radical-democratic and only 
average liberal components (FR, VS and BS). What is noticeable is that linguistic 
affiliation does not play a role here and the German-speaking, mixed language 
and French-speaking cantons in this group are all located close together. On the 
other hand, the same does not apply to the other two cantons in this group (TI 
and JU): The only Italian-speaking canton, Ticino, adopts average values on both 
axes and (together with Zurich) best approximates the Swiss mean. Deserving 
special mention is Jura, which is located within the group of liberal cantons with 
democratic movement and therefore very close to its former home canton, Berne.
Figure 2, with the axes “electoral accountability” and “radical participation,” 
displays only one typical dimension each of the two central democracy models. 
It emphasizes the important influence of 19th century constitutional-historical 
movements on cantonal democracy models at the turn of the 21st century: the par-
ticipatory elements of Swiss-German and Swiss-French cantons with no demo-
cratic-constitutional movement are still below average. (Former) Landsgemeinde 
cantons are still located in the lower-right quadrant, characterized by poor elec-
toral accountability relationships but high direct-democratic participation. Con-
versely, cantons which had strong liberal and democratic movements now have 
both strong electoral accountability and highly-developed direct-democratic 
forms of participation.
Furthermore, Figure 2 clearly shows that not all Swiss-German cantons are 
located together in the lower-right quadrant, but only the rural Central and Eastern 
cantons. These cantons provide their citizens with strong participation rights that are 
also more intensively used. The remaining Swiss-German cantons are divided across 
the other three quadrants, not conforming to the hypothesis of linguistic-regional 
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differences. As for St. Gall and Basel-City, they sit together with the Latin cantons 
because they too have higher values for electoral accountability and comparatively 
lower values for participation. Likewise, and again contrary to the linguistic-cultural 
hypothesis, the (predominantly) French-speaking cantons of Valais and Jura are 
both located in the lower-left quadrant. They not only have the expected low values 
for participation, but also below average values for electoral controls. Zug, Lucerne, 
Grisons and Schwyz are also in this quadrant, as they have (below) average values 
on both dimensions. Finally, Basel-Country, Zurich, Aargau, Schaffhausen and Solo-
thurn are located in the upper-right quadrant. They have high participation values 
and emphasize accountability and control of political representatives.
From Figure 2, one can thus interpret the following: the lower a canton’s value 
in the “participation” dimension, the higher its values for electoral accountabil-
ity (Pearson’s r = –0.55). This indicates that both dimensions are mutually exclu-
sive to a certain degree: a cantonal democracy emphasizes the accountability of 
political representatives and control of the elite either through elections or with 
direct-democratic referendums on specific issues. However, this connection can 
definitely not be explained by language alone.
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Figure 2: Conceptual Map of Cantonal Democracies upon Two Dimensions of The Democracy 
Models (electoral accountability and radical participation).
Explanation: Light grey: predominantly French-speaking cantons; grey: Ticino (TI); black: pre-
dominantly German-speaking cantons; the groups according to Kölz (2004): square: cantons 
with liberal regenerative movement but no democratic movement (VD, GE,NE, LU, SG); triangle: 
regenerative cantons with democratic movement (ZH, BE, SO, BL, SH, AG, TG); circle: Landsge-
meinde cantons (UR, SZ, AI, AR, OW, NW, GL, ZG, GR); diamond: cantons with special constitu-
tional development (BS, FR, VS, TI, JU).
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In a final empirical step we examine the hypotheses using multivariate 
regression models. The average values for liberal and radical democracy between 
1979 and 2009 and for the electoral accountability and participation dimensions 
serve as dependent variables. Alongside language14 and controls (age of constitu-
tion,15 primary sector16) as independent variables, the affiliation of the canton to 
the four groups of constitutional-historical movements is modelled as a categori-
cal variable (four dummy variables).
The regression analysis to a large extent confirms the results observed in 
Figures 1 and 2 (Table 2). Noticeable is the relevance of constitutional-historical 
movements for the current democracy positions of the cantons. The typology of 
constitutional movements according to Kölz (2004) is proven to be explanatory 
both for the development of cantonal liberal democracy and for the “electoral 
accountability” and “radical participation” dimensions. The linguistic-cultural 
hypothesis on the other hand has only partial explanatory power: though the 
French-speaking cantons have significantly higher liberal democracy values, 
there are no linguistic-cultural differences in the radical democracy model, nor 
in the two dimensions. The date of the most recent full revision of the cantonal 
constitution is significant for the position of cantons on the radical democracy 
axis: proximity in time of the revision corresponds to higher values on the radical 
democracy axis. This indicates that the radical democracy dimension measures 
not only different forms of citizen participation, but also current emancipatory 
demands of citizens and, in this way, is an expression of the present modernity of 
cantonal democracies. In this sense the explanatory power of the age of the con-
stitution can also be interpreted for the values of the liberal model and the partic-
ipation dimension: the younger a cantonal constitution, the higher the values for 
both. Finally, the other significant control variable (which measures the share of 
employment in the primary sector) confirms the observation from Figures 1 and 2 
that it is the generally rural Landsgemeinde cantons that are characterized by 
below-average liberal values and low electoral controls.
5  Conclusions
The present study has attempted to empirically measure the multi-dimensional 
quality of democracy in the Swiss cantons on the basis of comprehensive data 
14 This variable measures the proportion of French-speakers in a canton.
15 The age of the constitution is determined by the average number of years since the introduc-
tion of the last constitution (between 1979 and 2009).
16 This variable measures the primary-sector share of employment in a canton (agriculture etc.).
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and by using liberal-representative and radical-participatory democracy models 
as a conceptual basis. The political Erblast hypothesis, which points to a signifi-
cant role of 19th century constitutional movements for contemporary forms of can-
tonal democracies, was tested as an alternative explanation to the widespread 
linguistic-cultural hypothesis of clear democracy-typical differences between 
Latin and German-speaking Switzerland.
By looking at the distribution of cantons on the graphs Figures 1 and 2, it is 
clear that there is a strong formation of groups of German-speaking and Latin 
democracy patterns, although there are important exceptions. The francophone 
cantons are, for the most part, located together in the quadrant of strong liberal-
representative democracies. Basel-City and St. Gall are important exceptions, 
since they are also located in this quadrant but are German-speaking. The rad-
ical-democratic but least liberal Landsgemeinde cantons of Central and Eastern 
Switzerland are located on the opposite side of the graph. Finally, the North-West-
ern German-speaking cantons have both high radical- and liberal-democratic 
characteristics. The grouping of francophone cantons in the liberal-representa-
tive first quadrant, the positioning of the German-speaking Mittelland cantons 
in the second quadrant, and the distribution of the (former) Landsgemeinde 
cantons in the third and fourth quadrants all suggest a limited significance of 
specific linguistic and regional neighbor cultures. Notably the positions of Basel-
City, St. Gall, Jura, Valais, and Ticino, but also the heterogeneity of the Swiss-
German cantons, speak against an oversimplified parallel of linguistic-cultural 
and democracy characteristics.
Does the alternative approach that institutional arrangements are consid-
ered primarily as the result of common historical legacies and past constitutional 
 traditions offer a more profitable explanation than the widespread linguistic- 
cultural hypothesis? The individual positions of the cantons certainly show that 
the presented cantonal democracy patterns between 1979 and 2009 directly 
 correspond to the particular direction of cantonal constitutional movements 
between 1830 and the 1870s.17
Thus, the cantons of Geneva, Valais and Neuchâtel have above-average high 
values on the liberal-representative axis that clearly correspond to the strong 
position of their liberal-regenerative movements (and the simultaneous lack of 
a democratic movement) in the first half of the 19th century. Similarly, the liberal-
regenerative cantons with a strong democratic movement form their own group, 
characterized by both high liberal- and high radical-democratic values; they 
17 The regression analyses also indicate that the date of a complete revision of a cantonal con-
stitution plays an important role: the more recent the last revision of the constitution, the greater 
the inclusion of radical-democratic and emancipatory demands.
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thereby most closely resemble the ideal form of modern democracy. This approach 
also explains why the Swiss-German cantons of Basel-City, St. Gall and (partially) 
Lucerne are positioned within the group of liberal-representative Latin cantons. 
The unusual lack of a strong democratic movement in the medium-sized and large 
Swiss-German cantons (i.e. non-Landsgemeinde cantons) in the mid-19th century 
is clearly reflected in the current democracy structures of these three cantons. 
This approach also provides an explanation for the low liberal and participatory 
democracy values for Valais, reflecting the dominant conservative-catholic forces 
of the last century that gave rise to neither a strong liberal nor a democratic move-
ment. Finally, it can be observed that all (former) Landsgemeinde cantons are 
located below the liberal democracy axis. Referring to Figure 2 (electoral account-
ability vs. radical participation) in particular, a further differentiation within this 
group can be made. The three cantons located in the fourth quadrant (GR, SZ and 
ZG) with below-average values on both dimensions are not only those in which 
the assembly traditions lasted the shortest amount of time (dissolved in 1848 at 
the latest), but they are also those with the strongest regional conflicts (Outer- vs. 
Inner-Schwyz, Zug city vs. countryside, three Leagues and languages in Grisons). 
Conversely, the other (former) Landsgemeinde cantons in the third quadrant have 
had no comparable internal conflicts and the (pre-modern) Landsgemeinde tra-
ditions have been retained also post-1848. Table 3 is a summary of the classifica-
tion of present-day forms of democracy with their corresponding development of 
different 19th century constitutional movements and forms.
Overall, then, constitutional-historical legacies and the strength of 19th century 
social movements deliver a more persuasive explanation for the present forms of 
cantonal democracies than the widespread linguistic-cultural hypothesis. These 
Table 3: Classification of Current Cantonal Democracy Types on the Basis of Their Constitu-
tional Movements.
 
 
Weak radical democracy  
 
Strong radical democracy
(low values of radical 
participation)
(high values of radical 
participation)
Strong liberal 
democracy (high 
values of electoral 
accountability)
  – Liberal-regenerative cantons 
without democratic movement
  – Liberal-regenerative 
cantons with democratic 
movement  – Conservative cantons without 
regenerative movement
 
Weak liberal democracy 
(low values of electoral 
accountability)
  – Former Landsgemeinde 
cantons (before 1848) with 
strong regional conflicts
  – (Former) Landsgemeinde 
cantons (after 1848) without 
regional conflicts
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results make it clear that the dominant hypothesis of the dichotomy between 
direct-democratic German-speaking Switzerland and representative-democratic 
French-speaking Switzerland is too narrow. Rather, the main types of 19th century 
constitutional movement according to Kölz (2004) are still quite united forms of 
democracy and confirm the inertia of political institutions.
Appendix: Short definitions of the indicators used
Liberal Dimensions
Liberal Constitutionalism
Individual freedom
Freedom rights
kv_frr_priva   Constitutionally guaranteed protection of the privacy sphere
kv_frr_dign   Constitutionally guaranteed protection of human
kv_frr_life   Constitutionally guaranteed right to life, physical and psychic integrity
kv_frr_info   Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of information
kv_frr_data   Constitutionally guaranteed protection against misuse of personal 
data
kv_frr_mov   Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of movement
kv_frr_sciart   Constitutionally guaranteed right to academic freedom and freedom 
of art
kv_frr_fam   Constitutionally guaranteed right to marry and to found a family
kv_frr_opin   Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of opinion (building, uttering, 
propagating, and receiving)
kv_frr_bel   Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of faith, conscience and creed
Property rights
kv_frr_home   Constitutionally guaranteed protection of the sanctities of the home
kv_frr_est   Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of establishment
kv_frr_prop   Constitutionally guaranteed protection of property
kv_frr_econ   Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of trade and occupational choice
kv_frr_expro   Constitutionally guaranteed restrictions to expropriation
Acceptance of laws and regulations
kv_grr_rel   Constitutionally codified duty to respect the rights of others when 
exercising one’s own basic liberties
kv_legdut   Explicit constitutional codification of everybody’s obligation to comply 
with his legal duties
kv_ordsec   Constitutional codification of the state’s responsibility to protect the 
public security and order
crime_rate_N   Number of convictions under the penal law, per 1000 inhabitants 
(inverse)
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Limited scope ot the state
Actual scope
Staatko_od_N   Total public expenditures by canton and municipalities, in CHF per 
capita (inverse)
Verko_od_N   Cantonal (and municipal) expenditures for general administration and 
authorities, in CHF per capita (inverse)
verwdich_ktgem   Public employees of canton and municipalities together, per 100 
inhabitants (inverse)
Constitutional provisions
kv_check   Constitutional codification of a continuous assessment of public tasks 
for their necessity/portability
kv_budlim   Constitutional codification of the principles of an economical and 
balanced budget management of the state
kv_finvorb   Constitutional codification of conditional financing before adopting 
new public tasks
kv_taxhurd   Constitutional codification of institutional barriers for tax increases
Rule of law
Supremacy of the law
Formal supremacy of the law
kv_pr_hear   Constitutional codification of a right to a court hearing
kv_gesvorb   Constitutional codification of legal proviso
kv_retroban   Constitutional codification of the prohibition on retroactive legislation
kv_pr_judgm   Constitutional codification of a right for justified court ruling and 
instruction on the right to appeal
kv_willkverb   Constitutional codification of the prohibition of arbitrariness
Substantive supremacy of the law
kv_grr_restr   Constitutional restrictions of curtailing basic rights
kv_grrkern   Constitutional codification of the inviolability of the core of basic 
rights
kv_grrbind   Constitutional codification the commitment of public power and 
individuals to the basic rights
Legal equality
kv_pr_fair   Constitutional codification of the right for a fair (/and equal) treatment 
in court hearings
kv_gratadvice   Constitutional codification of the right for a free legal advice
kv_pr_grat   Constitutional codification of the right of deprived people for free legal 
assistance and legal aid
kv_diskrverb   Explicit constitutional prohibition of discriminating/benefitting certain 
groups with regard to the equality before the law
kv_rechtsgl   Explicit constitutional codification of a general equality before the law
Protection of minorities
Voting behavior favoring minorities
MF_Frauen   Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls 
regarding women
(Liberal Dimensions  Continued)
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MF_Sprachmind   Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls 
regarding language minorities
MF_Alte   Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls 
regarding elderly people
MF_Behinderte   Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls 
regarding handicapped people
MF_Auslaend   Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls 
regarding foreigners
MF_Militaerverw   Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls 
regarding deniers of military service
MF_Junge_Stim   Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls 
regarding the voting right of younger people
Consitutional provisions
kv_frr_lang   Constitutional guarantee of language freedom
kv_minprot   Constitutional codification of the protection of the rights of minorities
kv_frr_cohab   Constitutional guarantee of the freedom of the form of cohabitation
Horizontal accountability
Strength of parliament versus government
Independence
Eröffnung_N   Opening of the new legislature period by government (inverse)
Parlamentsdienst   Independent parliamentary secretariat resp. later parliamentary 
services
Id_Unver   Incompatibility of governmentary and parliamentary mandate
Supervisory powers
Akteneinsicht_Au   Insight in files by inspection commissions
Inforecht   Information right of members of parliament explicitly codified
Akteneinsicht_all   Inquiry and insight in files by general commissions
PUK   Possibility of inserting a (powerfull) parliamentary fact finding 
commission legally provided
Konfliktregelung   Final decision-making competence in case of conflict between member 
of parliament and government
Legislative powers
Legislative competencies of parliament
Reg_programm   Parliament treats government program
ParlInit   Possibility of parliamentary initiative
Fragestunde   Possiblity of question time
Legislative competencies of government
Finanzbefugnisse   Financial competences of government (inverse)
Dringlichkeitsrec   Right of urgent acts by government (invers)
Notrecht_N   Right in state of emergency by government (inverse)
(Liberal Dimensions  Continued)
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Power sharing in parliament
Regulations to support power sharing
kv_readings   Constitutionally defined number of readings before adoption of laws 
by parliament
minfrakrel_N   Number of members of parliament necessary for building a fraction, in 
relation to the number of seats in parliament (inverse)
Strength of the opposition
Oppositionsstaerk   Index of effective power of opposition parties versus governing parties 
in parliament (seat shares)
CoalitType2   Coalition type of government (minority, surplus majority, minimal 
winning, hegemonial)
Judicial independence
Separation from executive and legislature
Unvereinbar_KR   Incompatibility of mandate at the cantonal high court with 
parliamentary mandate
Funktionelle Una   Independence of courts/jurisdiction codified in constitution or law
Unvereinbar_RR   Incompatibility of mandate at the cantonal high court with government 
mandate
Personal independence
Unvereinbar_An   Incompatibility of mandate at the cantonal high court with mandate as 
advocate
Präsidentenwahl   Instance for confirming resp. electing the president of the cantonal 
high court
Unvereinbar_VR   Incompatibility of mandate at the cantonal high court with an 
administrative board mandate
Amtsdauer   Term of office of judges at the cantonal high court
Amtszeitbeschrän   Limitation of term of office at the cantonal high court (inverse)
Professionalization
Eignungsprüfung   Instance for controlling ability and eligibility of candidates for the 
cantonal high court
Wahlvorbereitung   Instance preparing elections
Aufsichtsorgan   Instance of superintendence
Organizational independence
Budgetrecht   Courts are sovereign in budgetary matters
Verwaltungsauto   Constitutionally or legally codified right of autonomous administration 
of courts or jurisdiction
Antragsrecht_Parl   Right for applying for finances directly at the parliament
Anstellung_Kanzl   Appointment of chancellery by highest cantonal court
Independent controlling instances
Administrative jurisdiction
Verwaltungsgeric   Administrative court as ultimate authority in disputes concerning 
administrative law
(Liberal Dimensions  Continued)
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Generalklausel   Efficacy of administrative court
VerwaltungsG_Ja   Years since introduction of an administrative court
Rechtsweggaranti   Guaranteed recourse to the cantonal courts also in cases concerning 
federal administrative law
Constitutional review
Verfassungsgeric   Institutionalized constitutional court
VerfG_Index   Index of powers of courts regarding constitutional review
Independent supervisory authorities
Ombuds   Existence of a cantonal ombudsman
FK_Umfang   Scope of financial control
kv_fincont   Constitutionally guaranteed independence of financial control
Electoral accountability
Secret elections
Free, secret, and regular elections
secelec_parl   Secret ballot at elections of cantonal parliament
secelec_reg   Secret ballot at elections of cantonal government
Competition
Electoral vulnerability in government
CompRegElec2   Difference between number of candidates and number of mandates in 
last total renewal elections
Kampfwahl_Reg   More candidates than seats in last total renewal elections
wett_reg_se   100% minus seat share of strongest party in government
Electoral vulnerability in parliament
wett_parl2_se_N   Difference between largest and second largest party in parliament, 
in % of all seats (inverse)
wett_parl_se   100% minus seat share of strongest party in parliament
Electoral availability
Electorate’s readiness to change their party vote
Volatilitaet_se_ye   Parliamentary volatility: Netto change of seat shares of parties, 
standardized for the length of legislature
reg_stab2   Change in party composition of government
Clarity of governmental responsibility
Clarity of governmental responsibility
reg_party_N   Number of governing parties (inverse)
spann_N   Range of party composition of governing coalition (inverse)
Governmental autonomy
Independence from the people between elections
reglegisl   Term of office of government, in years
parlegisl   Term of office in parliament, in years
Referendumsauss   No subsequent referendum possible in case of urgent acts, according 
to constitution
(Liberal Dimensions  Continued)
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Independence from specific interests
kv_transpint   Constitutional codification of an obligation of members of parliament 
to disclose interest bonds
kv_freemand   Constitutional codification of a free mandate for members of 
parliament
Autonomy from other state levels
transfer_N   Total revenues received from the federal state, in CHF per capita 
(inverse)
gem_init_ref2_N   Right of initiative and referendum for single municipalities on cantonal 
laws (inverse)
Radical Dimensions
Radical Participation
Extended electoral rights
Direct popular elections
volkwahl Years gone by since the introduction of direct popular election of 
cantonal executive
regpraes_volkwa Election of the executive’s president in popular elections
Ernennungsbehör Popular elections for the judges of the highest cantonal court
beratung_wahl Institutionalized opportunitiy for the citizens to collectively deliberate 
on elections and candidates
Possibility of recall
recall_reg Possibility to recall the cantonal executive from office ahead of time by a 
popular initiative
recall_parl Possibility to recall the cantonal parliament from office ahead of time by 
a popular initiative
Direct democracy competencies
Rights of initiative and referendum
GIR Index for the institutional openness of the popular statutory initiative, as 
proposed by Stutzer (1999)
VIR Index for the institutional openness of the popular constitutional 
initiative, as proposed by Stutzer (1999)
GRR Index for the institutional openness of the statutory referendum, as 
proposed by Stutzer (1999)
FRR Index for the institutional openness of the fiscal referendum, as 
proposed by Stutzer (1999)
Other direct democracy instruments
verfahrinit_scope Existence and scope of a popular right to propose a different order of 
votes, postponement of authorities’ projects, and/or revision of such 
projects
(Liberal Dimensions  Continued)
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beratung_sach Institutionalized opportunitiy for the citizens to collectively deliberate 
on the issues put to popular vote
KRR Index for the existence and institutional openness of the “constructive 
referendum”
Use of direct democracy competencies
Frequent ballots
Initot Number of popular initiatives put to vote
Reftot Number of referendums put to vote
Local self-government
Financial and perceived municipal autonomy
foed_tax_N Size of municipal as compared to cantonal fiscal revenues
foed_schreiber Degree of local autonomy as perceieved and reported by the heads of 
municipal administrations
Constitutional municipal autonomy
kv_gembest Constitutionally guaranteed right for the existing municipalities to 
continued existence
kv_gemaut Constitutional codification of municipal autonomy
kv_gemfusion Constitutional provisions concerning mergers of municipalities
Public accountability
Transparency of political processes
Transparency of parliament and communication by authorities
kv_vernehml Explicit constitutional codification of the mechanism of consultation
oeffprinz Legal enactment of the general rule that any governmental documents 
are freely accessible to the public
kv_behinfo Constitutionally codified duty of the authorities to inform the public 
about their activities
ParlSecretSess_N Provisions concerning the possibility of secret sessions or secret 
decisions on single agenda items by the parliament (inverse)
ParlProt Accessibility and elaborateness of the minutes of parliamentary 
sessions
Transparency of government and courts
kv_publger Constitutional provisions concerning the public access to judicial 
proceedings
kv_publreg Constitutional provisions concerning the public access to government 
sessions
Media
Legal frameworks for the media
kv_infodiv Constitutionally codified public task to promote information diversity
kv_zensverb Constitutional codification of the prohibition of censorship
kv_medfoerd Constitutionally codified public task to promote media access
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Media diversity
pressdiv Press diversity: Number of newspapers with self-contained, regular 
reporting on cantonal politics
presscompdist_exDegree of press competition within the subcantonal districts
Use of the media
Radio Share of survey respondents who use radio broadcasting for their 
opinion-making
Zeitung Share of survey respondents who use newspapers for their opinion-
making
Fernsehen Share of survey respondents who use television broadcasting for their 
opinion-making
Extra-institutional participation
Constitutional protection of extra-institutional participation
kv_frr_demo Constitutionally guaranteed freedom to demonstrate
kv_frr_pet Constitutionally guaranteed right to petition
kv_frr_stri Constitutionally guaranteed right to strike
kv_frr_assoc Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association
Participatory culture
Mitglied Share of survey respondents who are member of at least one political or 
economic organization
Leserbriefe Share of survey respondents who use letters to the editor for their 
opinion-making
Interesse Share of survey respondents who state to be very interested in politics
Inclusion
Equal political involvement
Universal suffrage
stimmalterakt Age required for the right to vote and to elect (inverse)
passelmin_go_N Age required for the right to be elected into the cantonal executive 
(inverse)
lady1 Female suffrage
Ausl_StiR Existence and scope of suffrage for foreign residents
Equal use of voting rights
T_Bildung_N Disproportionality of actual participation rates between groups of 
different education levels (inverse)
T_Qualifikation_N Disproportionality of actual participation rates between groups of 
different occupational statuses (invers)
turnout_v Turnout rate in cantonal popular votes
T_Geschlecht_N Disproportionality of actual participation rates between gender groups 
(inverse)
Minimal resources
Social rights
kv_sr_work Constitutionally guaranteed right to paid work
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kv_sr_dwell Constitutionally guaranteed right to housing
kv_sr_matmin Constitutionally guaranteed rights to a minimal amount of material 
resources, in case of need to be provided by public funds
kv_sr_heal Constitutionally guaranteed rights to the protection and advancement of 
one’s health
Rights to education
kv_sr_edurights Constitutionally guaranteed right to (adequate) education
kv_sr_eduquant Constitutionally codified public task to provide several educational 
services
kv_sr_eduacc Constitutionally guaranteed right to an equal and easy access to the 
educational services
kv_sr_edugrat Constitutionally guaranteed right to education free of charge
Inclusive representation
Minority-friendly electoral system
thresho_N Effective threshold to get a seat in the cantonal parliament (inverse)
proporz3reg Degree of proportionality of the electoral systems for parliamentary and 
governmental elections
parlmand Number of seats in the cantonal parliament
Representation of parties in parliament
rae Rae index of parliamentary party fractionalization
Gallagher_N Index for the effective disproportionality of the parliamentary electoral 
system, as proposed by Gallagher (inverse)
Voluntary proportional representation
reg_konk Cumulated vote share (in parliamentary elections) of all parties 
represented in government
kommprop Average number of seats in parliamentary committees per party
Proportional representation of socio-structural groups
Proportional representation by gender
Frauenteil_gov Share of female members in government
Frauenteil_parl Share of female members in parliament
Proportional representation by age and profession
Durchschnittsalte Average age of the members of government and parliament (inverse)
disrep_prof_reg_ Disproportionality of the occupational groups’ representation in 
government and parliament (inverse)
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